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Entrepreneurship plays an important role in job creation and economic growth. Due to 
these positive externalities, many countries have established policy programs and agencies 
aimed directly at encouraging entrepreneurship. Financial constraints are among the most 
cited impediments to entrepreneurship.1 If financial constraints are binding, low-wealth 
households will be constrained from starting businesses. Such constraints result in less 
entrepreneurial activity and, in turn, lower economic growth. Consequently, policy 
initiatives have often attempted to ease access to financing.  
The question of why aspiring entrepreneurs face financial constraints is natural. If 
financial constraints are imposed by well-functioning capital markets, we expect the 
marginal entrant to be of lower quality than is the average entrepreneur. In this study we 
use a natural experiment to test the hypothesis that the marginal entrant is of low quality. 
We test this hypothesis under the assumption that differences in quality will show up as 
differences in outcomes measured by performance. We use exogenous variation in wealth 
resulting from unanticipated inheritance due to sudden death to identify constrained 
entrepreneurs (i.e., individuals who become self-employed after receiving windfall wealth); 
we then assess their performance in relation to a matched sample of unconstrained 
entrepreneurs (i.e., individuals with similar characteristics who became self-employed in 
the same period but who did not receive windfall wealth). To measure performance, we 
examine survival rates, entrepreneurial profits, and total income. 
Our results reveal that constrained entrepreneurs perform significantly worse than 
do unconstrained entrepreneurs. After one (five) year(s), only 64.1% (41.9%) of the 
constrained entrepreneurs stay in business. In comparison, 75.0% (50.0%) of the 
unconstrained entrepreneurs in the control group stay in business. We also find lower 
performance when we examine entrepreneurial profits and total income using detailed 
data from the Danish Tax Authorities. On average, entrepreneurial profit is 22% to 39% 
lower for the constrained entrepreneurs over the first five years after establishment, while 
total income in the same period is 5% to 20% lower for constrained entrepreneurs. The 
combination of lower survival rates, lower entrepreneurial profit, and lower total income 
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supports the hypothesis that the marginal quality of constrained entrepreneurs is lower 
than that of unconstrained entrepreneurs. 
Although our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal 
entrepreneur is of low quality, the main weakness of our approach is that we cannot rule 
out confounding effects related to inheritances. While our experiment imposes no 
selection of beneficiaries except in the event of sudden death, entry into entrepreneurship 
is positively affected by inherited wealth. The treatment effect might therefore be 
confounded by a wealth effect that potentially can explain our results. To separate the 
treatment effect from a wealth effect, we use entrepreneurs whose parents suddenly die 
shortly after business formation as counterfactual in our experiment. In this setting, 
constrained entrepreneurs receive windfall wealth before they become self-employed, 
while unconstrained entrepreneurs receive the windfall shortly after business formation. 
We find that constrained entrepreneurs underperform both before and after 
unconstrained entrepreneurs receive windfalls. This finding effectively rules out the 
likelihood that our treatment effect is confounded by a wealth effect. 
Overall, we find that constrained entrepreneurs have significantly lower survival 
rates, lower entrepreneurial profits, and lower total income when compared with a 
matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs. We use a competing risk model to show 
that the lower survival rates are driven by higher failure rates among constrained 
entrepreneurs. We also show that differences in entrepreneurial profits and total income 
are not driven by efficient stopping rules or a direct effect of wealth on performance. 
Collectively these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal entrepreneur 
is of low quality.  
Our results offer an alternative interpretation of why aspiring entrepreneurs, when 
questioned in surveys, say that raising financing is their principal problem (Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1998). Consistent with the existence of financial constraints, prior literature 
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documents a positive correlation between the propensity to become an entrepreneur and 
individual wealth (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989; Fairlie 1999; 
Quandrini 1999; Gentry and Hubbard 2001), or exogenous variation in wealth due to 
inheritance or lottery winnings (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994b; Lindh and 
Ohlsson 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). While these studies demonstrate that 
low-wealth households are excluded from capital markets, this observation does not imply 
that policy makers should make loans easier to come by. De Meza (2002) shows that 
encouraging entry into entrepreneurship shifts individuals with negative net present value 
undertakings into business. Subsidizing credit may decrease efficiency because it offsets 
the disciplining role of capital markets. The barrier to firm formation might therefore be 
low entrepreneurial quality rather than access to financing. Direct empirical evidence on 
the disciplinary role of external financing is scant. A recent exception is Nanda (2008), 
who shows that entry subsequently dropped after a tax reform in Denmark that made 
external financing more expensive. Similarly, Hvide and Møen (2010) and Nanda (2011) 
show that the quality of wealthy entrants is lower because they do not face the discipline of 
the external market. In comparison, we assess the quality of the marginal entrant, by 
studying individuals who start a business after receiving windfall wealth. 
Our study contributes to the literature by using a natural experiment to test the 
hypothesis that the quality of the marginal entrant is low. We thereby challenge the 
premise behind policies that facilitate broad access to financing: frictions in the capital 
markets preclude entrepreneurs with good ideas from starting a new business. Our results 
question the welfare gains from promoting entrepreneurship among constrained 
individuals. Positive externalities from entrepreneurship on job creation and growth (King 
and Levine 1993a, 1993b) are less likely to materialize if the marginal entrepreneur is of 
low quality. 
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Our results, however, do not imply that all individuals with worthy projects will 
obtain financing. Frictions in the capital markets might prevent some entrepreneurs with 
good projects from starting a new business, and lenders might find it optimal to ration 
their access to capital. For instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present a model in which 
banks use the interest rate as a screening device. As a result, aspiring entrepreneurs with 
safer projects are discouraged from starting their businesses. Alternatively, local banking 
monopolies might limit access to financing for start-ups and subsequently distort 
entrepreneurship (Kerr and Nanda 2009, 2010). Our results also do not preclude the 
prevalence of lender discrimination against certain individuals. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that the rationale for initiatives to promote wider entrepreneurship should focus 
on eliminating the cause of frictions or discrimination rather than on providing broad 
access to financing. 
Section 1 presents our data and provides summary statistics. Section 2 presents the 
results, and Section 3 separates the treatment effect from possible wealth effects. Section 
4 concludes. 
 
1. Windfall Wealth from Unexpected Inheritance due to Sudden Death  
We exploit exogenous variation in individual wealth to test the hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs face financial constraints because of low entrepreneurial quality. Exogenous 
variation in wealth is derived from a natural experiment in which individuals receive 
windfall wealth due to the sudden death of their legal parents. For the identification 
strategy to work, the death event has to be unexpected and sudden.2 Sudden deaths are 
medically defined as an unexpected death that occurs instantaneously or within a few 
hours of an abrupt change in the person's previous clinical state.3 To this end, we have 
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assembled a unique dataset from Denmark that allows us to identify windfall wealth from 
unexpected inheritance and relate it to entrepreneurial activity.  
In addition to supplying micro data from administrative registers, the Danish case also 
provides us with a legal environment that eases the identification of estates and their heirs. 
We focus exclusively on inheritance cases where all beneficiaries are offspring (i.e., where 
the suddenly deceased was a widow or widower, or in rare cases, a couple). We refer to 
these cases as terminations of households. This designation simplifies the analysis, as 
children, according to the Danish Inheritance Law of 1964, will inherit by default the 
estate in proportional shares. Although opting out through wills is possible in Denmark, 
the inheritance law ensures that children will inherit at least 50% of the estate in the cases 
we consider. Only 2% of the empirically relevant individuals in Denmark have drafted a 
will (Ret og Råd, 2008). Consequently, the net wealth of the estates in our sample is 
divided equally among the offspring. 
Identification of estates is facilitated by the institutional environment. Danish law 
requires that a death certificate be issued by a doctor when a citizen dies. Danish law 
further obliges the relatives to report the death to their local funeral authority within two 
days. The funeral authority formally notifies relevant government agencies, including the 
Central Office for Personal Registration (CPR Registeret) and the probate court 
(Skifteretten). Skifteretten supervises the process that transfers legal title of property from 
the decedent’s estate to her beneficiaries. Skifteretten immediately seizes the decedent’s 
assets, with the purpose of meeting liabilities, and transfers the net worth to the 
beneficiaries according to the sharing rule established by the inheritance law. By law, the 
transfer of the decedent’s estate has to be finalized within 12 months of the death. The 
net worth of the estate is subject to a 15% estate tax for offspring if the estate’s net wealth 
exceeds DKK 191,000 (EUR 25,638) in 1998. This threshold is inflated by a price index 
in subsequent years.  
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A. Data sources 
Our data cover the population of adult Danes in the period between 1995 and 2007. 
Our analysis will, however, focus on individuals who inherit in the period from 1995 to 
2001 and, subsequently, start a business in the following year. This leaves a five-year 
evaluation period after firm formation to assess the outcome of the businesses. We 
construct a dataset with 19,329 individuals who unexpectedly inherited wealth due to the 
sudden deaths of their legal parents in the period from 1995 to 2001. 
Our dataset contains economic, financial, and personal information about all 
individuals in Denmark. We derive data from the following five sources made available 
through Statistics Denmark: 
1. Individual and family data from the official Danish Civil Registration System (CPR 
Registeret). We use these data to identify all individuals’ legal parents. The sample contains 
the entire Danish population and provides a unique identifying number across individuals, 
households, and time. 
2. Causes of deaths from the Danish Cause-of-Death Register at the Danish National 
Board of Health (Sundhedsstyrelsen). This dataset classifies the cause of death accordingly to 
international guidelines specified by the World Health Organization’s International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) system.4 The source of these data is the official death 
certificates conveying a medically qualified opinion on the cause of death. We have 
obtained the cause of death for all Danish citizens who passed away between 1995 and 
2007.  
3. Employment data from Statistics Denmark’s IDA database. Employment data are 
based on filings from firms and public agencies in the last week of November each year. 
From these filings we obtain the employment status of all individuals by their CPR 
number. We use this dataset to identify whether individuals become, and survive as, 
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entrepreneurs. We follow prior literature and define entrepreneurs as self-employed  
(Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 
1994a; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994b; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Fairlie 
1999; Quandrini 1999; Gentry and Hubbard 2001; and Hurst and Lusardi 2004). Statistics 
Denmark classifies individuals as self-employed whenever 50% of their total income 
originates from entrepreneurial profit. This ensures that we study individuals who are full-
time self-employed. In fact, individuals classified as self-employed in our sample on 
average obtain more than 90% of their total income from entrepreneurship; most of the 
remaining residual income is financial income. In addition, the data allow us to check 
whether individuals’ parents are entrepreneurs and, thereby, to control for differences in 
entrepreneurial propensities and possible inheritance of businesses.  
4. Income and wealth information from the official records at the Danish Tax and 
Customs Administration (SKAT). SKAT receives this information directly from the 
relevant sources: employers supply statements of wages paid to their employees. Financial 
institutions supply information on their customers’ deposits, loans, mortgages, interests 
(paid or received), security investments, and dividends. SKAT’s measure of net wealth 
includes the most important components of individual wealth (bank deposits, bank loans, 
property values, mortgages, stocks, mutual funds and bonds.)5 SKAT’s definition of total 
income equals the sum of labor income, financial income, and entrepreneurial profit. 
Labor income is wages from paid employment; financial income includes realized capital 
gains, interests (received or paid), and dividends. Entrepreneurial profit is the pre-tax 
profit from self-employment and includes potential gains if the business is sold. The 
Danish Tax code requires that entrepreneurs submit an income statement to the tax 
authorities. The income statement follows the tax code for corporations, starting with 
revenues, business expenses, depreciations, and profits. Profits are taxed as personal 
income, and the tax code allows entrepreneurs to smooth profits, and hence taxes, 
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through savings inside the firm. Through Statistics Denmark, we have access to 
entrepreneurial profit as well as the savings inside the firm.  
5. Education records from the Danish Ministry of Education. All completed (formal 
and informal) courses of education are registered on a yearly basis and made available 
through Statistics Denmark.  
 
B. Data construction 
The starting point of our analysis is deceased parents who cause a termination of the 
household.  Terminations of households occur whenever i) the last living parent dies, or 
ii) both parents die within the same calendar year. In total, we identify 83,602 terminations 
of households between 1995 and 2001. Panel A in Table 1 shows the distribution across 
time. From this sample, we identify the cause of death with the purpose of selecting a 
sample of household terminations resulting from sudden and unexpected death. Panel B 
details the cause of death based on WHO’s ICD-10 codes.  
The identification of relevant ICD-10 codes relies on related medical literature as well 
as a thorough inspection of WHO’s detailed classification system.6 Thus, among natural 
deaths, we consider acute myocardial infarction (ICD-10: I22-I23), cardiac arrest (I46), 
congestive heart failure (I50), stroke (I60-I69), and sudden deaths by unknown causes 
(R95-R97) as sudden deaths. Among unnatural deaths, traffic accidents (V00-V89) and 
other accidents and violence (V90-V99, X00-X59, and X86-X90) are unanticipated by the 
relatives. The latter category excludes suicide or violence by subjects related to the 
deceased. Panel B tabulates the number of deaths for each type of sudden death, whereas 
Panel C shows the total number per year. In total, we identify 12,068 terminations of 
households due to sudden deaths from 1995 to 2001.7 
The final step in our sample selection entails linking the deceased to their 
beneficiaries. On average, each terminated household had 1.60 beneficiaries (i.e., 
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children). This step expands our sample size to 19,329 individuals who experience a 
wealth windfall.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of our final sample of beneficiaries. As the main 
focus of the study is identifying individuals who become entrepreneurs after receiving 
windfall wealth, we split our sample into pre-shock entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
For all individuals, we report income, wealth, age, gender, education, and marital status 
for the year prior to their parents’ sudden death. Income and wealth are indexed to 
constant 2000 Danish kroner (DKK). In our sample, 5.8% of the beneficiaries (1,123 
individuals) were already entrepreneurs.8 In keeping with prior literature, Table 2 shows 
that entrepreneurs have significantly higher income and wealth, are older, and tend to be 
male. Table 2 also reports the size and distribution of windfall wealth. On average, 
beneficiaries receive a windfall of DKK 228,800 (EUR 30,700). Inherited wealth is also 
quite liquid. The deceased parents hold, on average, around half of their wealth in 
financial assets (bank account, bonds, and stocks). The windfall is economically 
important, as it is almost twice as large as the average pre-inheritance net wealth of DKK 
133,900 (EUR 17,900). The distribution of inherited wealth has substantial variation. One 
quarter of the beneficiaries inherit nothing, while individuals in the fourth quartile of the 
distribution of inherited wealth on average receive a windfall of DKK 859,600 (EUR 
115,500). Pre-shock non-entrepreneurs inherit, on average, DKK 220,400 (EUR 29,600), 
which is equivalent to 1.04 years of total income, or 1.87 times the pre-shock net wealth. 
Thus, the size of windfall appears large enough to provide sufficient financial cushion for 
aspiring entrepreneurs to start their own businesses. 
 
2. Empirical Results 
A. Windfall wealth and the propensity to become entrepreneur 
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To test the effect of windfall wealth on entrepreneurial activity, we estimate the 
difference in entrepreneurial activity around the parent’s sudden death. This approach is 
attractive because it effectively controls for time-invariant individual characteristics that 
are likely to impact the decision to become and be an entrepreneur. Because our main 
interest is to understand the startup decision and performance of new entrepreneurs, we 
focus solely on individuals who were not self-employed before the event.  
The starting point of the analysis is the 18,206 beneficiaries who were non-
entrepreneurs prior to receiving windfall wealth (see Table 2). If financial constraints limit 
firm formation, we expect beneficiaries to exhibit a greater propensity to become 
entrepreneurs after receiving windfall wealth. To control for expected level of entry 
absent windfall wealth, we compare the treatment group to a control group of individuals 
with the same characteristics who do not receive windfall wealth. Our control group is a 
matched sample of individuals of exactly the same age, gender, and education level, and 
from the same pre-inheritance income and wealth vigintiles (i.e., twenty groups of equal 
frequency) in the same year as the treated individual. Thus, we apply a one-to-many exact 
matching procedure, which provides us with a difference-in-differences estimate of the 
average treatment effect of windfall wealth on becoming an entrepreneur.9  
For some beneficiaries, we cannot identify a match, and as a result, the sample is 
reduced to 18,009 beneficiaries. Among these, 2.1% (377 individuals) become self-
employed after receiving windfall wealth. In comparison, 0.83% of the control group 
becomes an entrepreneur. The difference-in-differences estimate of 1.27 percentage 
points is significant at the 1% level.  
In Table 3 we run cross-sectional regressions of the propensity to become an 
entrepreneur among the treated individuals. The dependent variable is the difference 
between an indicator variable for entry of the treated and the average entry rate for the 
matched sample (i.e., the difference in differences of the propensity to become an 
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entrepreneur for the treated relative to that of the control group). The variable of interest 
is inherited wealth measured in million DKK. Our specifications also include variables to 
capture changes in individual characteristics and year fixed-effects.10 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows a positive and significant effect of inherited wealth on the 
propensity to become an entrepreneur. The effect is significant both economically and 
statistically. Windfall wealth of 1 million DKK (EUR 134,200) increases the probability of 
an individual starting her own business by 0.95 percentage points.11 This figure is relative 
to a baseline probability of entering into entrepreneurship of 2.1% for the sample of 
treated individuals, and 0.83% for the matched sample. 
In columns 2 and 3 we address the critique by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) that relates to 
inheritance of businesses. In principle, the relationship between windfall wealth and 
entrepreneurship could be driven by inheritance of entrepreneurial estates. In our sample, 
2.6% of the estates are entrepreneurial. If beneficiaries tend to continue these businesses, 
the issue appears large enough to explain most of the variation in data. In Column 2 we 
therefore include an indicator for whether the deceased was an entrepreneur (entrepreneurial 
estate), and note that the effect of windfall wealth on the propensity to become an 
entrepreneur remains largely unchanged. In Column 3 we entirely exclude entrepreneurial 
estates from the sample with little effect on the results.  
In Column 4 we include parental wealth among our match characteristics to control 
for the potential higher propensities to become an entrepreneur in wealthy families. For 
instance, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) argue that because of strong intergenerational 
correlation in educational, occupational, savings, and wealth preferences, inherited wealth 
might capture different entrepreneurial propensities of wealthy families.12 We note that 
the marginal effect of inherited wealth increases when the control group has identical 
parental wealth. Thus, the positive effect of windfall wealth on the propensity to become 
an entrepreneur is not driven by differences in family wealth. 
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At first glance, the marginal effects of windfalls might appear economically small. Yet 
the propensity to become an entrepreneur among treated individuals is more than twice as 
high as the control group. Thus windfall wealth allows constrained individuals to become 
entrepreneurs. This finding is consistent with prior literature (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and 
Rosen 1994b; Lindh and Ohlsson 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). Our final 
sample includes 355 potentially constrained entrepreneurs who formed a business after 
receiving windfall wealth, and excludes 22 beneficiaries who inherit from an 
entrepreneurial estate and subsequently become entrepreneurs. 
 
B. The performance of the marginal entrepreneur 
Our experiment identifies 355 potentially constrained entrepreneurs. To assess the 
performance of the constrained entrepreneurs, we analyze their survival rate, 
entrepreneurial profit, and total income in relation to a matched sample of unconstrained 
entrepreneurs. The matched sample consists of individuals of the same age, gender, 
education level, and pre-entrepreneurship income and wealth vigintiles (excluding 
inheritance) who start a business at the same time as the treated individuals. In case of 
several matches, we use the matched individual with the closest pre-entrepreneurship 
income to the treated individual. Thus, we apply a one-to-one exact matching procedure.13 
Matching on age, gender, length of education, income, wealth, and entry year is possible 
because each year, on average, around 25,000 individuals become entrepreneurs. Despite 
the large control group, we fail to match 51 constrained entrepreneurs, and as a result, the 
sample is reduced to 304.14 
Table 4 reports the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. 
The average entrepreneur is 39.5 years old, and 72% are male. Average annual income in 
the year before becoming an entrepreneur is DKK 200,700 for constrained, and DKK 
207,200 for unconstrained, entrepreneurs. Due to inheritance, net wealth is significantly 
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larger for constrained entrepreneurs. The average constrained entrepreneur possesses 
wealth of DKK 1,052,500 (EUR 141,300), while unconstrained entrepreneurs possess 
DKK 98,800 (EUR 13,300). This difference is caused by the windfall as we match on pre-
inheritance wealth. Panels B, C, and D of Table 4 show no statistically significant 
difference between the distribution of individual, geographic, and industry characteristics 
of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Thus, without inheritance, constrained 
and unconstrained entrepreneurs appear identical based on observable characteristics. 
Panel A in Table 5 shows average survival rates for constrained entrepreneurs and the 
matched sample after 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years. Entrepreneurship is risky: on average, 64.1% 
of the constrained entrepreneurs survive the first year, and only 41.9% survive the first 
five years. In comparison, the survival rates for the unconstrained entrepreneurs are 
significantly higher. After the first year, 75.0% of the unconstrained entrepreneurs survive, 
and after the first five years, 50.0% survive. The difference in survival rates between 
constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs is significant—both economically and 
statistically. 
The difference in survival rates documented in Panel A in Table 5 might reflect that 
constrained entrepreneurs are faster at exiting, due to efficient stopping rules; have more 
successful exits; or are taking more risk than the average entrepreneur. In Panel B, we 
therefore examine entrepreneurial profit, which includes both savings inside the firm and 
potential gains from successful exits. Panel B of Table 5 documents that unconstrained 
entrepreneurs have higher entrepreneurial profits than do constrained entrepreneurs. The 
average difference in entrepreneurial profit varies between DKK 29,600 and 75,100 per 
year. Moreover, all differences are both economically and statistically significant.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of entrepreneurial profits to examine whether the 
lower averages are driven by the tails of the distribution. We assign constrained 
entrepreneurs into bins using the quintile cut-off points from the distribution of 
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entrepreneurial profits for unconstrained entrepreneurs in year 1. If the distributions are 
identical, we expect 20% of the constrained entrepreneurs to be assigned to each bin. 
Figure 1 shows a different pattern. Constrained entrepreneurs are overrepresented in bin 
1 (low income), as 26% are assigned here, and underrepresented in bin 5 (high income), as 
only 14% are assigned here. Among the top 10% we also find large differences: Only 8% 
of the constrained entrepreneurs are assigned here, and their average entrepreneurial 
profit equals DKK 662,000, while that of unconstrained entrepreneurs equals DKK 
834,000. The difference in the distribution of entrepreneurial profit shows that the lower 
performance is not driven by outliers. 
Panel C of Table 5 shows that differences in entrepreneurial profit persist when the 
sample is reduced to surviving entrepreneurs (both treatment and control have to 
survive). Again we find that unconstrained entrepreneurs have higher income from 
entrepreneurship. The differences are large and significant in the initial phase. By the end 
of the fifth year, when only 41.9% of the constrained entrepreneurs have survived; the 
difference in profit is smaller.  
While entrepreneurial profit includes retained earnings, the tax code makes it 
advantageous to retain earnings inside the firm.  Retained earnings are only partly taxed in 
the income year and partly taxed in the year of extraction. Postponing income taxes by 
retaining earnings is particularly valuable in years with high income because of progressive 
taxation. As the ability to benefit from this tax rule is likely to be increasing with wealth, 
we examine in Panel D whether constrained entrepreneurs retain more entrepreneurial 
profit than do unconstrained entrepreneurs. Panel D shows that, on the contrary, 
unconstrained entrepreneurs retain more earnings than do constrained entrepreneurs. 
In Panel E of Table 5, we report the total income for constrained and unconstrained 
entrepreneurs. The assessment of total income helps to ascertain whether lower survival 
rates of constrained entrepreneurs are driven by constrained entrepreneurs being more 
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effective at imposing efficient stopping rules. If constrained entrepreneurs are more 
effective at imposing efficient stopping rules, we expect them to have higher total income 
either because they return to paid employment or because they stop loss-making 
businesses earlier. If this is the case differences in total income will be smaller. We further 
expect the differences in total income to be smaller because total income includes cost of 
external financing (interest payments) and excludes opportunity cost of capital for self-
financed entrepreneurs. Constrained entrepreneurs possess more wealth than 
unconstrained entrepreneurs, and are therefore more likely to self-finance their business. 
Thus the inclusion of financial income will bias against finding differences in total income. 
Panel E of Table 5 reports the difference in total income between constrained and 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. After their first year as entrepreneurs, constrained 
entrepreneurs have DKK 23,600 lower total income than unconstrained entrepreneurs. 
The difference is equivalent to 11.8% of the pre-entrepreneurship level. In years 2 and 3, 
the difference increases to DKK 34,800 and 38,800, respectively. Both differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In years 4 and 5, the difference in total income 
declines to DKK 29,700 and 10,400, respectively.  
Panel A in Figure 2 provides a comparison of total income among constrained and 
unconstrained entrepreneurs, while Panel B compares the total income for individuals 
who receive windfalls but stay in employment to a matched sample of similar individuals. 
On average, constrained entrepreneurs earn less from self-employment. The area between 
the two lines provides a graphical illustration of the relative underperformance of 
constrained entrepreneurs. Interestingly, Panel B shows no effect on total income for 
individuals who received windfall wealth but stayed in paid employment.  
The lower income from entrepreneurship is hardly surprising, as prior literature 
documents lower earnings from self-employment. Using survey data on U.S. individuals, 
Hamilton (2000) compares the wage differential between self-employed and paid 
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employees.  He finds that the self-employed earn a significantly smaller stream of future 
earnings. This finding suggests that entrepreneurs are willing to sacrifice substantial 
earnings in exchange for non-pecuniary benefits, such as the value of “being your own 
boss.” The lower income might also be attributed to the ability to underreport income 
among the self-employed. Estimates of underreporting in United States range from 18 to 
57% (Slemrod 2007, Sarada 2010), while the average underreporting in Denmark is 14.8% 
among self-employed who are randomly selected for a tax audit (Kleven et al. 2011). We 
note that while the magnitude of underreported income can explain part of the drop in 
income for individuals who become self-employed, it cannot explain differences in 
earnings between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs unless constrained 
entrepreneurs are more prone to evade taxes. We consider this possibility in Section 3. 
 
C. Determinants of the performance of the marginal entrepreneur  
Although the comparison between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs 
successfully controls for time-invariant individual heterogeneity captured by our match 
characteristics, it is still interesting to examine the marginal effect of individual 
characteristics. In Table 6, therefore, we run regressions of entrepreneurial outcomes, 
while controlling for individual characteristics, and report the marginal effects. 
In Column 1 of Table 6, the dependent variable is business closure taking the value 
one if the business is closed, either as a failure or a success. Our variable of interest is an 
indicator taking the value one if the entrepreneur is constrained. By construction there is 
no time variation in constrained. We therefore use the pooled data over the five-year 
window to evaluate performance, and estimate the relationship in a logit model with 
clustered standard errors at the individual level. We include age, gender, education, pre-
entrepreneurship income, pre-inheritance and pre-entrepreneurship wealth, indicator 
variables equal to one if the entrepreneur is married or has children, and year effects. The 
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results reveal that constrained entrepreneurs, on average, are 8.85 percentage points more 
likely to close their businesses. This difference is significant at the 1% level.  
Exits capture both failure through closure of the business or success through selling 
the business. To examine that the lower survival rates of constrained entrepreneurs are 
driven by failure rather than success, we follow Fine and Gray (1999) and estimate a 
competing risk model. Success through business sales is not directly observed in our data, 
but profits from sales are included in the entrepreneurial profit recorded by the tax 
authorities. We therefore characterize an exit as success if a large positive entrepreneurial 
profit is reported in the year of exit, and an exit as failure if the entrepreneurial profit is 
low. We use a conservative characterization of success and set the cutoff level to DKK 
100,000. According to this conservative classification, 16.5% of all exits are classified as 
successful outcomes (14.8% for constrained entrepreneurs and 18.4% for unconstrained 
entrepreneurs). Column 4 of Table 6 reports the results from the competing risk model. 
We estimate a sub-hazard rate of failures of 1.34 for constrained entrepreneurs, which is 
significant at the 1% level.15  Thus, constrained entrepreneurs fail much faster than do 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. 
In columns 2 and 3 we analyze the income from entrepreneurship. Again we use the 
pooled data from the five-year window, while controlling for individuals characteristics 
and year-fixed effects. We estimate the relationship using a linear regression model where 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Column 2 shows that constrained 
entrepreneurs, on average, earn DKK 69,000 less per year in entrepreneurial profits over 
the five years.  These differences are relative to a pre-entrepreneurship total income of 
DKK 200,700 and are, thus, economically significant. Column 2 shows that constrained 
entrepreneurs, on average, also have DKK 25,810 lower total income per year than do 
unconstrained entrepreneurs in the five years after business formation. We also note that 
the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior literature: 
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entrepreneurial profit is increasing in education and pre-entrepreneurship total income 
and is decreasing in age.  
To nuance the story, in alternative specifications we also examine the difference in 
entrepreneurial profits and total income between constrained and unconstrained 
entrepreneurs. We find that the underperformance of constrained entrepreneurs is higher 
for individuals with higher pre-entry income and longer education. In general, 
performance is increasing in both income and education for both constrained and 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. Yet, because the increase is larger for the latter group, the 
underperformance of constrained entrepreneurs is increasing in income and education. 
We also find the underperformance to be stronger for individuals who do not stay with 
their industry (measured at the 4-digit industry level). This evidence suggests that 
underperformance is concentrated among individuals who, despite having longer 
education and higher income, could not obtain financing to undertake projects outside the 
industry in which they were employed.     
One concern with the results in columns 2 and 3 is that the underperformance could 
be driven by exiting entrepreneurs. The samples in columns 5 and 6 therefore only 
contain entrepreneurs who are active at the beginning of each year, and exclude failed 
entrepreneurs in the following years. Again, we find significantly lower entrepreneurial 
profits and total income among the constrained entrepreneurs. On average, constrained 
entrepreneurs have DKK 75,200 lower entrepreneurial profits when the sample is 
restricted to active businesses. If we focus on total income, the average difference is DKK 
35,700 per year.  
In summary, constrained entrepreneurs appear to have significantly poorer outcomes 
than have the average unconstrained entrepreneur. They have lower survival rates and 
earn significantly lower profits from their businesses. The poor performance is consistent 
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with our hypothesis that these individuals face constraints to entrepreneurship because of 
their low quality rather than their access to financing. 
 
3. Treatment versus Wealth Effects 
Although the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 supports the hypothesis that entrepreneurs 
face financial constraints because of low entrepreneurial quality, our experiment shows 
that entry into entrepreneurship is positively affected by inherited wealth. The treatment 
effect might therefore be confounded by a wealth effect that potentially can explain the 
results. For instance, wealth might positively affect risk taking, investments, consumption 
through the firm, savings inside the firm, and tax avoidance and, thereby, possibly explain 
the observed performance measured through profits and income. Alternatively, 
entrepreneurship can be interpreted as a luxury good that only wealthy individuals can 
afford.  
The idea that wealth can affect entrepreneurial outcomes is not new. For instance, 
Hvide and Møen (2010) show that entrepreneurs’ start-up performances are a function of 
their wealth. They find that the relationship between start-up performance, as measured 
by profitability on assets, and wealth increases in the first three wealth quartiles but drops 
in the top wealth quartile. Nanda (2008) also provides evidence of higher failure rates 
among the most-wealthy entrepreneurs, which suggests that the spike in entry at the top 
end of the wealth distribution is driven by low-ability entrepreneurs who can afford to 
start weaker firms because they do not face the discipline of external finance. 
To assess whether our interpretation of the evidence is consistent with a treatment 
effect and not driven by a confounding wealth effect, we perform several additional tests.  
 
A. Controlling for inherited wealth 
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We start the analysis and discussion of treatment versus wealth effects by examining 
whether inherited wealth directly affects outcomes. According to the alternative 
interpretation of the uncovered evidence as being driven by a confounding wealth effect, 
we expect inherited wealth to correlate negatively with outcomes. We therefore include 
inherited wealth as a control variable in our empirical specifications.  
Column 1 of Table 7 shows a positive effect of inherited wealth on failure rates and 
negative effects on entrepreneurial profits and total income, but all effects are statistically 
insignificant. More importantly, the estimated coefficients on the indicator for constrained 
entrepreneurs are of similar magnitude when compared to the estimates in columns 1, 2, 
and 3 in Table 6.  There appears to be no systematic relationship between inherited wealth 
and outcomes, and the inclusion of windfall wealth does not impact the estimated 
underperformance of constrained entrepreneurs. 
Another way to address whether the treatment effect is confounded by a wealth effect 
is to revise our match characteristics. Rather than matching on pre-inheritance wealth, we 
match on the post-inheritance level. If our results are driven by the confounding wealth 
effect, we should expect to see no difference in performance between constrained and 
unconstrained entrepreneurs when we match on post-inheritance wealth. Column 2 in 
Table 7 reports the results. The findings in Column 2 show that large differences in 
performance between the constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs are not driven by 
a general effect of wealth on firm performance.  
 
B. Controlling for parental wealth 
Differences in parental wealth might also influence aspiring entrepreneurs’ ability to 
form a successful business. In particular, we find that beneficiaries’ propensity to become 
self-employed is increasing in inherited wealth and, thus, parental wealth. Differences in 
parental wealth might explain the documented underperformance if individuals from 
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wealthy families are less motivated to exert effort. Although including inherited wealth 
and matching on the post-inheritance wealth level partly addresses this issue, one might 
still be concerned with the possibility of family wealth influencing the results. In Column 
3 of Table 7, we therefore report the performance of constrained entrepreneurs in relation 
to a matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs from equally wealthy families. Thus, 
rather than matching on pre-inheritance wealth, we match on parental wealth. 
From Column 3 of Table 7, we observe economic underperformance of constrained 
entrepreneurs, consistent with the main results. We also note that the differences in 
performance are slightly smaller than the main results when we match on parental wealth. 
We conjecture that this result is driven by parental financing of offspring entrepreneurs 
among the control sample. If parents desire to provide financial support to offspring, they 
are likely to finance projects that could not obtain financing from financial intermediaries. 
 
C. Using unconstrained entrepreneurs who receive windfall wealth as control group  
Our final tests focus on using existing entrepreneurs whose parents die suddenly in 
years 1 to 3 after business formation as counterfactual in our experiment. Existing 
entrepreneurs are unconstrained in the sense that they started their businesses before 
receiving windfall wealth. As sudden deaths are unanticipated, we can use the exogenous 
timing of the windfall to unconstrained entrepreneurs to directly test whether our results 
are confounded by a wealth effect. If windfall wealth affects entrepreneurial outcomes, 
the performance of unconstrained entrepreneurs will be negatively affected after they 
inherit wealth. Hence, under the alternative hypothesis, we expect the differences in 
performance to be larger before unconstrained entrepreneurs inherit. 
We form a control sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs who start a business at the 
same time but inherit in years 1 to 3 after business formation. We match on education 
level, gender, pre-entrepreneurship income, and wealth (excluding inheritance). We relax 
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the exact matching on age because the sample of treated unconstrained entrepreneurs is 
relatively small.16 With these matching criteria we can successfully match 140 constrained 
entrepreneurs to unconstrained entrepreneurs, and except for age, no statistical difference 
exists between the characteristics of the two groups. On average, constrained 
entrepreneurs are 39.9, and unconstrained entrepreneurs, 41.8, years old. While this 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level, we note that this difference will bias 
against finding differences in performance, as age in general correlates negatively with 
entrepreneurial performance (see Table 6).   
Results in Column 4 of Table 7 provide evidence in favor of our hypothesis. 
Unconstrained entrepreneurs are 11.5% more likely to survive than constrained 
entrepreneurs. After unconstrained entrepreneurs receive windfall wealth, the difference 
in survival rates increases by 1.9 percentage points, as indicated by the interaction term 
(Constrained * Treatment of unconstrained entrepreneurs). We find similar results for 
entrepreneurial profit. Before unconstrained entrepreneurs inherit wealth, their 
entrepreneurial profit is DKK 90,900 higher than that of constrained entrepreneurs, and 
after inheritance, the difference increases to DKK 99,700. 
Finally, we perform a placebo test to examine whether inherited wealth has an adverse 
effect on performance among our sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs who inherit in 
years 1 to 3 after business formation. If wealth affects outcomes through the channels 
previously discussed, we expect performance to decline once unconstrained entrepreneurs 
receive windfall wealth. 
Column 5 in Table 7 reports the results from the placebo test (treatment of unconstrained 
entrepreneurs) of the effect of inherited wealth on outcomes for unconstrained 
entrepreneurs as compared to a matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs who do 
not receive windfall wealth. We note that unconstrained entrepreneurs who receive 
windfalls survive slightly longer than does the matched sample. This result is consistent 
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with the findings of Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994b), who analyze the effect of 
inherited wealth on performance of existing entrepreneurs two to three years after 
receiving an inheritance. When we inspect the underlying survival rates, we note that the 
difference tends to decline over time. Thus, windfalls to existing entrepreneurs postpone 
exit but have little long-term effect. We conclude that the placebo test bolsters our 
hypothesis that the lower survival rates, profits, and income of constrained entrepreneurs 
are driven by lower entrepreneurial quality. 
 
D. Alternative specifications 
The online Appendix to this paper shows results for a number of alternative 
specifications of the main analysis. The alternative specifications include using different 
matching procedures, matching criteria, and control variables. Overall the results from the 
alternative specifications are consistent with the main results. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Financial constraints are frequently cited as a main barrier to entrepreneurship. 
Evidence of such financial constraints has previously been identified either in cross-
sectional tests of the propensity to become an entrepreneur or in surveys of aspiring 
entrepreneurs. While the evidence is consistent with the existence of financial constraints, 
prior literature has not presented a formal test of the underlying causes of the apparent 
financial constraint. We propose and examine a simple explanation for the apparent 
financial constraints to entrepreneurship. We conjecture that a well-functioning capital 
market would fund able entrepreneurs and constrain individuals with lower 
entrepreneurial quality. Using a natural experiment to generate exogenous variation in 
wealth, we test this hypothesis by identifying a group of previously constrained 
individuals, who become entrepreneurs after receiving the windfall. We compare the 
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performance of these businesses to the performance of businesses established by 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. We find large differences in performance, consistent with 
our hypothesis that individuals face financial constraint as a result of low entrepreneurial 
quality.  
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Table 2  Characteristics of pre-inheritance entrepreneurs vs. non-entrepreneurs 
 
 All Pre-inheritance 
Entrepreneur 
Difference 
  Yes 
(1) 
No 
(2) 
 
(1)-(2) 
 
Panel A: Income, financial wealth, and net wealth
Total income (DKK 1,000) 209.9
(145.4)
192.0
(197.6)
211.0
(141.5) 
 -19.1***
[-4.26]
Financial wealth (DKK 1,000) 
 
97.7
(788.2) 
270.4
(919.3) 
87.1
(778.1) 
183.4***
[7.58] 
Net wealth (DKK 1,000) 133.9
(1115.0)
394.2
(1995.1)
117.8
(1034.5) 
 276.4***
[8.08]
 
Panel B: Individual characteristics
Age (years) 41.4
(10.2)
45.3
(9.0)
41.1
(10.3) 
  4.1***
[13.20]
Gender (% male) 54.0
(49.9)
79.0
(40.8)
52.5
(50.0) 
  26.5***
[17.44]
Education (years) 11.8
(2.9)
11.9
(3.0)
11.8
(2.9)
  0.1
[0.75]
Married (%) 51.9
(50.0)
64.6
(47.8)
51.1
(50.0) 
 13.5***
[8.81]
Children in household (%) 46.1
(49.9)
49.0
(50.0)
46.0
(49.8) 
3.0**
[1.97]
 
Panel C: Inherited wealth
Average 
 
228.8
(883.1) 
364.2
(869.5) 
220.4
(883.2) 
143.7***
[5.30] 
1st quartile 0.6
(1.1)
0.7
(1.2)
0.6
(1.0)
0.2**
[2.15]
2nd quartile 17.8
(11.9)
19.7
(12.0)
17.7
(11.9) 
1.9**
[2.56]
3rd quartile 145.2
(68.4)
153.6
(68.2)
144.7
(68.4) 
9.0**
[2.15]
4th quartile 859.6
(1753.1)
965.6
(1315.5)
849.3
(1789.9) 
116.3
[1.22]
  
N 19,329 1,123 18,206  
  
 
We report descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for all beneficiaries, beneficiaries who are pre-inheritance 
entrepreneurs, and non-entrepreneurs, respectively. For each beneficiary, we report total income, financial wealth (bank 
account, bonds, and stocks), net wealth before inheritance, age, gender, education (years of schooling), marital status, and 
whether there are children in the household. For each set of descriptive statistics, we also compute the difference in the 
average characteristics of pre-inheritance entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and test whether these differences are 
significantly different from zero. All amounts are in thousand year-2000 DKK. One Euro is equivalent to DKK 7.45.  
Standard errors are in parentheses, and t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3  Exogenous changes in wealth and firm formation 
 
Independent variable Difference-in-differences of the propensity to become entrepreneur 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample All All Non-
entrepreneurial 
estates 
Non-
entrepreneurial 
estates matched 
on parental 
wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Inherited wealth  0.0097*** 0.0086*** 0.0102*** 0.0137*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0051) 
Inherited wealth squared -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0011** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
   
Entrepreneurial estate  0.0232**   
  (0.0099)   
   
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes, fixed Yes, fixed Yes, fixed Yes, fixed
N 18,009 18,009 17,539 10,675 
   
 
The dependent variable is the difference between an indicator variable for entry of the treated and the average entry rate for 
the matched sample (i.e., the difference in differences of the propensity to become an entrepreneur for the treated relative to 
that of the control group). The control group consists of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, vigintile 
of the income distribution, and vigintile of the wealth distribution. In addition to matching on general characteristics, the 
control group is matched on parental wealth in Column 4. Inherited wealth is measured in million year-2000 DKK. Inherited 
wealth squared is the square of inherited wealth. Entrepreneurial estate is an indicator for whether the deceased was an 
entrepreneur. Control variables include (indicator variables) for changes in marital status and family size. The reported 
coefficients are marginal effects at the sample means. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  Characteristics of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs 
 
Pre-entrepreneurship characteristics Constrained Unconstrained Difference 
 (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Panel A: Income, financial wealth, and net wealth 
Total income (DKK 1,000) 200.7
(7.7) 
207.2
(6.3) 
 -6.3
[-1.26] 
Average income change (DKK 1,000) 
 
-8.5
(3.3) 
-6.4
(3.0) 
-2.2
[-0.54] 
Financial wealth (DKK 1,000) 
 
1089.6
(936.9) 
141.8
(22.2) 
947.8
[1.01] 
Net wealth (DKK 1,000)  1052.5 
(945.9) 
 98.8 
(51.3) 
953.7 
[1.02] 
 
Panel B: Individual characteristics 
Age (years) 39.5
(0.5) 
39.5
(0.5) 
-
Gender (% male) 71.7
(2.6) 
71.7
(2.6) 
-
Education (years) 12.0
(0.2) 
12.0
(0.2) 
-
Married (%) 54.3
(2.9) 
51.3
(2.9) 
 3.0
[0.76] 
Children in household (%) 49.7
(2.9) 
46.7
(2.9) 
3.0
[0.83] 
 
Panel C: Region of residence 
Capital region (%) 31.6
(2.7) 
31.9
(2.7) 
Zealand (%) 15.5
(2.1) 
17.8
(2.2) 
Southern Jutland and Funen (%) 20.1
(2.3) 
19.7
(2.3) 
Central Jutland (%) 24.7
(2.5) 
23.0
(2.4) 
Northern Jutland (%) 8.2
(1.6) 
7.6
(1.5) 
χ2-test 0.75
Panel D: Industry 
Manufacturing (%) 7.6
(1.5) 
7.9
(1.5) 
Construction (%) 8.6
(1.6) 
10.2
(1.7) 
Retail (%) 10.5
(1.8) 
8.6
(1.6) 
Services (%) 50.0
(2.9) 
48.7
(2.9) 
Transportation (%) 4.9
(1.2) 
4.9
(1.2) 
Unknown (%) 18.4 
(2.2) 
19.7 
(2.3) 
 
χ2-test 1.27
  
N 304 304
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We report descriptive statistics (mean and standard error) for constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Constrained 
entrepreneurs are individuals who become entrepreneurs after receiving windfall wealth due to the sudden death of their 
parents. The matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs consists of individuals who were able to start their businesses 
without receiving windfall wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs have the same age, gender, and length of education; are 
from the same vigintiles of the income and wealth distributions; and started their businesses at the same time as the 
constrained entrepreneurs. In Panel A we report total income, average income change in the 3 prior years, financial wealth 
(bank account, bonds, and stocks), and net wealth after inheritance. Panel B reports individual characteristics: age, gender, 
education (years of schooling), marital status, and whether there are children in the household. Panel C reports the region of 
residence, whereas Panel D reports the main industry. For each set of descriptive statistics, we also compute the difference 
in the average characteristics of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs and test whether these differences are 
significantly different from zero. All amounts are in thousand year-2000 DKK. Standard errors are in parentheses, and t-
statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Differences in firm survival rates, entrepreneurial profits, and total income  
 
 Year 0 Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
 
Panel A: Survival rates
Constrained entrepreneurs 1.000 0.641 0.580 0.535 0.457 0.419
   
Unconstrained entrepreneurs 1.000 0.750 0.637 0.588 0.530 0.500
   
Difference - -0.109*** -0.057 -0.053 -0.073* -0.081**
  [-2.90] [-1.49] [-1.34] [-1.92] [-1.98]
   
N 304 304 304 304 304 304
 
Panel B: Entrepreneurial profits 
Constrained entrepreneurs 101.3 141.7 121.2 110.6  104.0 106.3
   
Unconstrained entrepreneurs 128.8 182.7 184.6 183.0 179.1 155.2
   
Difference -27.5* -41.0** -63.4*** -72.4*** -75.1*** -48.9**
 [-1.84] [-1.98] [-3.03] [-3.11] [-3.21] [-2.16]
   
N 304 304 304 304 304 304
 
Panel C: Entrepreneurial profits among surviving firms
Constrained entrepreneurs 101.3 170.7 165.7 174.0 198.4 244.3
   
Unconstrained entrepreneurs 128.8 196.9 235.8 243.3 251.1 263.8
   
Difference -27.5* -26.2 -70.1*** -69.3** -52.7* -19.5
 [-1.84] [-1.31] [-3.03] [-2.24] [-1.70] [-0.54]
   
N 304 227 202 169 132 104
 
Panel D: Retained earnings
Constrained entrepreneurs 9.6 11.8 10.3 9.9 14.3 12.2
   
Unconstrained entrepreneurs 22.8 25.3 11.6 7.6 23.0 16.5
   
Difference -13.1** -13.5 -1.3 2.3 -8.8 4.4
 [-2.06] [-1.16] [-0.12] [0.18] [-0.73] [-0.44]
   
N 304 304 304 304 304 304
 
Panel E: Total income 
Constrained entrepreneurs 158.9 156.9 167.7 177.7 177.2 194.1
   
Unconstrained entrepreneurs 172.4 180.5 202.5 216.5 206.9 204.5
   
Difference -13.5 -23.6 -34.8*** -38.8*** -29.7** -10.4
 [-1.39] [-1.63] [-2.69] [-3.03] [-2.40] [-0.85]
   
N 304 304 304 304 304 304
   
 
This table reports survival rates, entrepreneurial profits, and total income for constrained individuals who become self-
employed after receiving windfall wealth. The matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs consists of individuals who 
were able to start their businesses without receiving windfall wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs have the same age, 
gender, and length of education; are from the same vigintiles of the income and wealth distributions; and started their 
businesses at the same time as the constrained entrepreneurs. Panel A reports survival rates. Panel B reports entrepreneurial 
profits; Panel C reports entrepreneurial profits for surviving firms; Panel D reports retained earnings; while Panel E reports 
total income. Difference is the difference in income between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Profits and 
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income are measured in 1,000 DKK. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  Treatment versus wealth effect 
 
 Treatment test  Placebo test
Matching criteria on wealth Pre-
inheritance 
wealth 
Post-
inheritance 
wealth 
Parental 
wealth 
Pre-
inheritance 
wealth 
Pre-
inheritance 
wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Business closure 
Constrained 0.0841** 0.0748*** 0.0604 0.1146* 
 (0.0335) (0.0314) (0.0463) (0.0661) 
Inherited wealth  0.0185     
 (0.0552)  
Constrained * Treatment of unconstrained 0.0189 
    (0.0571)  
Treatment of unconstrained   -0.0604**
  (0.0304)
  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 3023 3017 1508 1373 3128
Panel B: Entrepreneurial profit 
Constrained -61.72*** -65.67*** -55.64** -81.23*** 
 (19.17) (19.17) (26.97) (28.08) 
Inherited wealth  -30.67  
 (19.98)  
Constrained * Treatment of unconstrained -11.16 
 (24.48) 
Treatment of unconstrained  10.31
  (20.05)
  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 3013 3006 1501 1364 3128
Panel C: Total income 
Constrained -22.49*** -28.89*** -47.13*** -19.77 
 (10.24) (10.89) (15.74) (20.20) 
Inherited wealth  -13.67  
 (11.83)  
Constrained * Treatment of unconstrained 3.22 
 (18.97) 
Treatment of unconstrained  -5.21
  (13.09)
  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
  
N 3013 3006 1501 1364 3128
  
 
Columns 1 to 4 report the differences in business closure, entrepreneurial profit, and total income between constrained and 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. Constrained entrepreneurs are individuals who become self-employed after receiving windfall 
wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs are a matched sample of individuals who were able to start their businesses without 
receiving windfall wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs have the same age, gender, and length of education; are from the 
 38 
 
same vigintiles of the income and wealth distributions; and started their businesses at the same time as the constrained 
entrepreneurs. The main exception is Column 4, in which the matched sample consists of unconstrained entrepreneurs who 
receive windfall wealth in year 1 to 3 after business formation. Unconstrained entrepreneurs in Column 4 have the same 
gender and length of education; are from the same vigintiles of the income and wealth distributions; and started their 
businesses at the same time as the constrained entrepreneurs. Column 5 reports differences in business closure, 
entrepreneurial profits, and total income from a placebo test of inherited wealth among unconstrained entrepreneurs who 
suddenly inherit in years 1 to 3 after business formation. Columns 1, 4, and 5 use pre-inheritance wealth to form the 
matched sample. Column 2 uses post-inheritance instead of pre-inheritance wealth to form the matched sample of 
unconstrained entrepreneurs. Column 3 uses parental wealth instead of individual wealth to form the matched sample of 
unconstrained entrepreneurs.  Regressions in panels A, B, and C are specified as columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 6, respectively.  
Constrained is an indicator for being classified as a constrained entrepreneur. Treatment of unconstrained is an indicator equal to 
one after the treatment of unconstrained entrepreneurs with windfall wealth. Inherited wealth is in million DKK. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Relative distribution of entrepreneurial profit for constrained entrepreneurs in Year 1 
 
 
This figure reports the distribution of entrepreneurial profit for constrained entrepreneurs relative to the distribution for 
unconstrained entrepreneurs in year 1. Constrained entrepreneurs are assigned into bins using the quintile cut-off points 
from the distribution of entrepreneurial profits for unconstrained entrepreneurs in year 1. Quintile 1 (5) represents the 
lowest (highest) entrepreneurial profits. If the distributions are identical, we expect 20% of the constrained entrepreneurs to 
be assigned to each bin.  
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Figure 2 
Panel A: Average total income around windfall wealth and business formation 
 
Panel B: Average total income around windfall wealth for continuted employment 
 
 
Panel A plots total income for constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Constrained entrepreneurs are individuals 
who become self-employed after receiving a windfall wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs are a matched sample of 
individuals who were able to start their businesses without receiving windfall wealth. Unconstrained entrepreneurs have 
the same age, gender, and length of education; are from the same vigintiles of the income and (pre-inheritance) wealth 
distributions; and started their businesses at the same time as the constrained entrepreneurs. Panel B plots total income 
for continued employment among individuals who receive windfall wealth but continue with their existing jobs (Treated.) 
The control group consist of a matched sample of similar individuals. Total income is indexed to the pre-entrepreneurship 
and pre-inheritance level (Year -1 = 100).   
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FOOTNOTES: 
                                                 
1 Surveys of current and aspiring entrepreneurs suggest that obtaining financing is one of the principal hurdles to 
forming and growing new businesses (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). Not surprisingly, access to financing is 
high on the policy agenda around the world. In the United States, for example, the Small Business 
Administration has, since 1954, delivered millions of loans and guarantees for bank loans to facilitate the 
financing of small businesses. Many OECD countries are also encouraging entrepreneurship by easing access to 
financing (see OECD [2010] for an overview of policies across countries).   
2 We also need the death event to be uncorrelated with omitted variables that affect the outcome variable; e.g., 
the decision to become an entrepreneur.  
3 For instance, the American Academy of Paediatrics defines sudden cardiac death as a non-traumatic, 
nonviolent, unexpected event resulting from sudden cardiac arrest within 6 hours of a previously witnessed state 
of normal health. 
4 WHO’s International Classification of Diseases, ICD-10, is the latest in a series that has its origin in the 1850s. 
WHO took over the responsibility of ICD at its creation in 1948, and the system is currently used for mortality 
and morbidity statistics by all Member States. 
5 SKAT does not have information about individuals’ holdings of cash outside bank accounts, the value of their 
cars, their private debt (e.g., debt to private individuals), or other informal wealth holdings (e.g., antiquities or 
stamp collections). 
6 See WHO’s webpage at www.who.int/classifications/icd/en, and Andersen and Nielsen (2011) for references 
to the medical literature. 
7 As sudden death, by definition, excludes deaths that are caused by chronic diseases or involve treatment of the 
deceased prior to death, the classification effectively rules out many of the most common causes of death: For 
instance, 29% and 33% of all deaths are due to neoplasia (mainly cancer) and diseases in the circulatory system, 
respectively. Among these common causes, only acute myocardial infarction, sudden cardiac arrest, congestive 
heart failure, and strokes are considered sudden deaths. Thus, only 12.5% of natural deaths are classified as 
sudden and unexpected. 
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8 On average, 8% of the workforce in Denmark is self-employed. Our beneficiaries are significantly younger than 
the average individual in the workforce. Becoming self-employed is positively correlated with age, experience, 
and wealth. We therefore have a lower fraction of self-employed (5.8%) among beneficiaries when they inherit. 
9 The methodology of difference-in-differences matching follows from Heckman et al. (1998). We report 
consistent results using different matching procedures as presented in Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Hirano and 
Imbens (2004) in the internet appendix. We employ our exact 1-to-many matching procedure for simplicity. 
10 Our control variables include indicator variables taking the value one if the individual gets married, gets 
divorced, or has children. We obtain marginal effects of similar magnitude if we alternatively omit control 
variables, include fixed region-year effects, or include fixed industry-year effects. These results are available in the 
internet appendix. 
11 One standard deviation increase in inherited wealth yields a marginal effect of 0.86 percentage points, which is 
close to the reported effect of one million DKK of inherited wealth. 
12 For instance, Altonji and Dunn (2000) and Charles and Hurst (2003) document strong intergenerational 
correlations in occupation, education, wealth, and saving preferences. 
13 We use the one-to-one exact matching procedure to minimize differences in pre-entrepreneurship income 
between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. In the internet appendix we report consistent results 
when use 1-to-many matching.  
14 The match frequency can be increased by decreasing the list of pre-entrepreneurship characteristics that we 
match on, because we use exact matching. We obtain quantitatively similar results when we match on fewer 
characteristics or use propensity score matching, but also note that the unmatched characteristics of constrained 
and unconstrained entrepreneurs become less similar. Thus, the presented matching is preferred because it 
provides a more precise mapping of the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. In the 
Internet Appendix, we conduct a sensitivity analysis, varying matching criteria. 
15 Our definition classifies 54 out of 328 exits as successes. Using different cutoff levels to define “success” 
changes the estimated sub-hazard rate for constrained entrepreneurs very little. We obtain sub-hazard rates of 
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1.338, 1.288, and 1.284 when we alternatively define success as exits with entrepreneurial profit above DKK 
50,000, DKK 250,000 and DKK 500,000, respectively. 
16 Table 2 shows that our sample of beneficiaries includes 1,123 individuals who are entrepreneurs before they 
receive windfall wealth. As we require that the windfall occurs shortly after business formation, the number of 
unconstrained entrepreneurs who receive windfall wealth is even lower, which forces us to exclude age as a 
matching characteristic. 
